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1 Introduction
Sovereign defaults are relatively common around the world: they disrupt the ability of a
country to produce value and may be very costly for the economies that experience them.1
The costs incurred can be interpreted as if they were shocks to productivity originating from
a decision to default. These costs have been incorporated into the relevant literature as drops
in total factor productivity (TFP) consistent with certain key facts, in particular the fall
in GDP that countries experience during a default. We therefore label them ‘TFP default
costs”.
After the model of the crisis in Mexico drawn up by Cole and Kehoe (1996) other papers
such as Arellano et al. (2012), Cole and Kehoe (2000),Da-Rocha et al. (2013), Conesa and
Kehoe (2014) and Conesa and Kehoe (2015) coincide in setting the costs of a default at a
fall in TFP of around 5%, but there is little guidance as to whether this number is too high
or not, or as to how far TFP could possibly fall in a default episode.
Following Cole et al. (2005) we calibrate the TFP default cost using financial information
on stock price indices.2 Our sample comprises Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, from 2009 to 2012. In this period all the
countries in the sample experienced a large negative correlation between their risk premiums
and stock prices.
We build a stochastic continuous time model of sovereign default decisions that reproduces
the negative correlation between stock prices and risk premiums observed in the data. The
government is the only decision maker, and it maximises its expenditure. It faces a two-way
choice: either it services the sovereign debt and receives a stream of tax proceeds, driven
1As Mendoza and Yue (2012) report, in almost every episode GDP fell below trend, external financing
shut down, interest rates peaked, external debt built up and labour input fell dramatically, imposing large
potential costs on each economy that experienced default.
2They find a much stronger correlation between the stock market and future productivity during the
Great Depression than in US postwar cyclical fluctuations.
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by a stochastic TFP process or it defaults and receives a stream of taxes but driven by a
different stochastic process: government default decisions trigger a permanent change in the
drift and variance of the stochastic TFP process. Firms use government decisions to generate
beliefs concerning the probability of default. Thus the spot price of an asset reflects the best
knowledge about the future prospects of the impact of a default on TFP and the interest rate
spread reflects the risk of defaulting on debt and so on. As the risk premium is declining
in productivity, the value of the firm is increasing and the model generates the negative
correlation observed in the data.
Our main target is to calibrate the productivity process of a typical country, so we pool all
countries (and all years). We find that for a typical country financial markets discount a
3.70% drop in TFP. If we run our calibration for each country and average their costs of
default we find that TFP falls by 5.88%. The rest of the paper explores the implications
of the model. In particular, we focus on whether the model is able to produce a reasonable
description of a typical debt crisis, the recovery process and the impact of fiscal policy on
this type of crisis; and on whether default zones are increasing at the initial level of debt -
a theoretical implication in many models of default.
The model predicts that GDP will fall by 3.71% for a typical country that experiences a
debt crisis. Compared to these predictions, the countries in our sample experienced a 4%
fall in GDP. Our model also predicts that countries should have resumed growth at a rate of
1.17% after the crisis. Given that the model predicts a positive rate of growth after default,
recovery is inevitable, so it would be nice if the model could accommodate the timing of
recovery observed in past default episodes. We use Argentina in 2002 as an example. It
took about two years for the Argentine economy to attain its pre-default GDP. Our model
predicts that the probability of recovery for Argentina was two thirds. Note that longer
recovery times are not ruled out, but they are less likely.
Finally, we find a strong positive correlation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the (pre-
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dicted) default zones across countries. We use this feature of the model to argue that fiscal
expansion crises of this type have small multiplying effects on economic activity. According
to our model a fiscal expansion of 25% of the initial level of debt-to-GDP translates into a
drop of .61% in GDP. Our model is therefore consistent with small fiscal multipliers, so Eu-
ropean governments should not be surprised that fiscal expansions have proved ineffective or
even counterproductive as ways of escaping from the debt crises. We take all these features
as a test of the goodness of our model.
Our paper is related to the literature that uses continuous time models and Brownian mo-
tion processes to study debt crises. These tools are standard in finance literature and are
becoming increasingly popular in macro debt crisis literature; see for instance Aguiar et al.
(2013); Nun˜o Barrau and Thomas (2015); Na et al. (2015); M. and Vardoulakis (2013) and
Du and Schreger (2013).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 below presents the model that we
use to estimate the regime-switching parameters of the underlying TFP process. Section
3 presents the data needed to estimate TFP parameters and inform the model. Section 4
presents the main results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This paper presents a model of government default decisions. The objective of any govern-
ment is to maximise government expenditure, assuming that its budget (including interest
payments on sovereign bonds) balances at all times. Tax revenues depend on the imple-
menting of a TFP regime-switching stochastic process. If proceeds are low enough it may be
in the best interest of the government to default on sovereign bonds, closing bond markets
forever and triggering a change in regime of the TFP process. Such a change in regime cap-
tures the potential productivity losses in case of a default. Given the structure of the model,
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we can estimate the parameters of the TFP process using information on stock prices. The
stochastic process, the government default decision problem and the implied value of the
firm which will be incorporated into the data are specified below.
Productivity Process: the specification of the continuous time regime-switching stochastic
process for productivity is key to our model. This process is written as a geometric Brownian
motion:
dA = µsAdt+ σsAdzt.
As with any Brownian motion, productivity is characterised by a deterministic component
and a stochastic component, which is a Wiener process. The drift µs of the deterministic
component and the variance σs of the Wiener process are functions of the government’s
default decision s ∈ {d, nd}, where s = nd stands for the state of the economy with no
default and vice-versa. In case of a default, the productivity drift and the variance switch
to a different regime and stay there forever.
Government Problem: the government is the only decision-maker. At all times it faces
the following budget constraint equation:
τA− g + [q(A)− 1]b = 0.
where A is productivity, τ is a tax rate, g is government expenditure, b is the stock of
debt, and q(A) is its corresponding price. The immediate objective of the government is to
maximise g
g = τA+ [q(A)− 1]b,
and at each moment the only decision that the government has to make is whether or not
to default.3 There is no other decision to be made as government expenditure is in fact a
3This would be similar to assuming a benevolent government that tries to maximise the utility of a
representative household with a separable utility function in private and public consumption.
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stochastic process, where the government’s default decision is about choosing what stochastic
process is to drive expenditures. In case of a default the drift and variance of government
expenditure would be (µ, σ) = (µd, σd),), whereas if the government does not default it
would be (µ, σ) = (µnd, σnd).). Upon default there are no more decisions to be made, as
bond markets are closed forever.
Therefore the government’s problem can be written as a Bellman equation:
W (A) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
τA+ (q(A)− 1) b+ (1 + rdt)−1EW (A+ dA),W d(A)}
s.t.
dA
A
= µnddt+ σnddz,
where W (A) is the value of repaying, made up of the immediate government expenditure
and the expected continuation value of repaying.4 W d(A) is the value of defaulting, which
equals the expected discounted value of government expenditure from the time of default,
and is driven by a stochastic process of drift µd and variance σd:
W d(A) =
∫ ∞
0
τAe−(r−µd+σ
2
d/2)tdt =
τA
r − µd + σ2d/2
.
This gives a stationary stopping rule which is a threshold value Ad for productivity. If A falls
below this threshold, the government will choose to default and stay in the default region
forever.
The government’s value of repaying W (A) can be expressed as an ordinary second order
differential equation
rW (A) = τA+ [q(A)− 1]b+ µndAW ′(A) + σ
2
nd
2
A2W ′′(A) (1)
4We assume neutral agents. For the consequences of assuming agents concerned with the worst case
scenario see Araujo (2015).
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with a boundary and smooth pasting conditions
W (Ad) =
τAd
r − µd + σ2d/2
,
W ′(Ad) =
τ
r − µd + σ2d/2
.
Note that default regions depend on the price of the bond, q(.), which is endogenous in the
government’s default decision.
Risk Premium: the risk premium is the difference in returns between a bond and a risk-free
asset
1
q(A)
− (1 + r)
where r is the risk-free rate of return and q(A) is the price of the bonds issued, which is
related to the government’s decision through the productivity stochastic process.5 Using
Ito’s lemma q(A) can be found as a solution to a partial differential equation:
rq(A) = µndAq
′(A) +
σ2nd
2
A2q′′(A) (2)
subject to the following boundary conditions q(Ad) = 0 and limA→A∗ q(A) =
1
1 + r
. The first
boundary condition follows from the assumption that after a default bond holders are not
repaid and the market closes, so the price of bonds is zero. The second boundary condition
states that the price of a risk-free bond is (1+r)−1 where A∗ is the safety productivity level.6
Value of firms: As in a standard asset pricing model in continuous time the value of a
representative firm is linked to the trend in its fundamental value. In this particular case
the firm’s value is determined by a regime-switching stochastic process. If there is no default
5This is a reduced form of an enforcement mechanism or an optimal debt contract. A theoretical charac-
terisation of the effect of enforcement on the interest rate can be found in Krasa et al. (2008). Optimal debt
contracts are designed in Hvide and Leite (2010) and Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2014).
6This productivity level is chosen in the same way as S&P and Fitch classify bonds as AAA or Moody’s as
Aaa. An obligor that has issued a prime quality bond is considered as having an extremely strong capability
of meeting its financial commitments. See for example Moody’s (2009) and S&P (2009).
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the value of a firm is made up of the instantaneous return plus the expected change in the
value of the firm. The expected change depends on the probability of default p(A)
rVnd(A) = µndAV
′
nd(A) +
σ2nd
2
A2V ′′nd(A) + p(A) [Vd(A)− Vnd(A)] (3)
with boundary and smooth pasting conditions Vnd(Ad) = Vd(Ad) and V
′
nd(Ad) = V
′
d(Ad). If
there is a default, the value of the representative firm is:
rVd(A) = µdAV
′
d(A) +
σ2d
2
A2V ′′d (A)
with boundary conditions Vd(0) = 0 and V
′
d(0) = 0. Note that in case of default there are
no further changes in regime or, therefore, in the value function of the firm.
To be able to compute the value of the firm when there is no default we need to solve the
equation for the value of the firm in case of default and determine the probability of default.
If the government defaults the value of a firm can be solved in closed form as Vd(A) = A
βd ,
where βd is the positive root of
σ2d
2
β2 + (µd − σ
2
d
2
)β − r = 0, its characteristic equation.
The probability of default can be obtained by solving the following partial differential equa-
tion
0 =
σ2nd
2
A2p′′(A)
which turns out to be a Gaussian distribution, with boundary conditions p(Ad) = 1 and
limA→∞ p(A) = 0. The first boundary condition reveals that if A ≤ Ad then the probability
of default is zero, similarly if A→∞ the probability of default is zero.
2.1 Equilibrium
Definition: the stationary equilibrium for this economy comprises a government value func-
tion {Wd,Wnd(A)}, a threshold rule for default Ad and a bond price q(A) such that:
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i) Given bond prices, q(A), the default threshold ruleAd and value functions, {Wd,Wnd(A)},
solve the government problem (equation 1); .
ii) Government policy satisfies, q(Ad) = 0 (equation 2); .
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard. The representative firm generates beliefs as to the
probability of default by observing q(A)to derive its value. In equilibrium, the firm’s beliefs
as to the probability of default coincide with the probability of default induced by government
decisions.
-
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Ad
q(Ad, µnd, σnd)
-
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Figure 1: Risk premium, pi(A); Bond prices, q(A); Default region, Ad; and firms value V (A).
A higher risk premium implies a lower firm value.
Solution: solving the stationary equilibrium entails finding the solutions to three second-
order differential equations (equations 1-3). Equation 1 is a non-homogeneous second order
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differential equation with constant coefficients, Equation 2 is a homogeneous second order
differential equation with constant coefficients and Equation 3 is a non-homogeneous second
order differential equation with non-constant coefficients. Using Laplace transforms and
power series expansions equilibrium can be obtained by solving a system of linear equations
(see the Appendix).
With this model it is possible to estimate the drifts and variances of the regime-switching
productivity process from observables in the data. Specifically, we estimate the model using
information on stock prices and risk premiums. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition. Panels (a)
to (d) show key elements of the equilibrium with two key threshold values selected on their
axes: the threshold value of a default, A∗ and the threshold value of a risk-free bond Ad.
In panel (a) productivity is plotted against the risk premium. As productivity approaches
Ad, the risk premium diverges to infinity as the probability of repaying is zero, which causes
the price of the bond to collapse to zero, as shown in panel (b). Panel (c) plots productivity
against the value of the firm, which is monotonically increasing. As the risk premium is
declining in productivity and the value of the firm is increasing, the model produces a
negative correlation between stock prices and risk premiums. The estimation strategy is
described in the next section.
3 Data and Calibration
We use data7 on stock prices and 10Y bond yields for 9 European countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.8 These
countries provide an adequate sample for estimating the parameters of our model. They be-
long to a free trade area with a common currency, they have similar levels of development,
7We obtained the data from Bloomberg.
8We are using Germany as the risk-free option, but we do not use this country explicitly in our estimations.
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and their institutions and their business cycles are synchronised. Most importantly, their
financial markets behaved similarly on the cusp of the European sovereign debt crisis.
Table 1: Financial series
Country Stock market indices 10Y government bonds
Austria ATX GTATS10Y
Belgium BEL20 GTBEF10Y
Spain IBEX GTESP10Y
Finland HEX GTFIM10Y
France CAC GTFRF10Y
Netherlands AEX GTNLG10Y
Ireland ISEQ GTIEP10Y
Italy FTSEMIB GTITL10Y
Portugal PSI20 GTPTE10Y
Germany GTDEM10Y
Table 1 shows the label of the Bloomberg series that we use. We use daily data from 2009 to
2012. We pick the most important stock index for each country and 10Y government bonds.
Stock indices are normalised so that 3/1/2008=100. We compute series for the probability of
default in each country, Pj = 1− Rj
Rger
, using Germany as the risk-free option, where R stands
for the interest rate of the 10-Y Bond in each country, therefore Germany is considered to
have a probability of default of zero.
We also need fiscal data to feed into our model: taxes, debt and government expenditure as
a proportion of GDP. We find the information that we need in the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook Database. The risk free interest rate is set to 2.86%. Table 2 displays the statistics
computed. The data show that there is substantial heterogeneity in taxes, government
expenditure and debt as a proportion of GDP, which will be exploited by the model.
Figure 2 shows the time series for stock prices and risk premiums for the countries in our
sample and presents their correlation. An interesting observation that is exploited in the
calibration is a substantial negative correlation between stock prices and risk premiums
between 2009 and 2012 for the countries in the sample. This correlation turns to be close to
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Table 2: Fiscal Policy Parameters
Aut Bel Fin Fra Ire Ita Ndl Por Spa
T/GDP 48.50 49.49 53.83 49.21 33.88 46.15 45.20 40.73 36.33
G/GDP 52.63 53.77 54.77 56.77 47.71 49.81 50.80 49.76 46.65
b = B/GDP 69.19 97.78 49.00 79.19 117.12 120.80 60.76 122.99 84.08
Figure 2: Stock Prices and Risk Premium: Stock Prices and Risk Premium: Stock Price
Index (black line) and Risk premium, obtained from 10-Y Bond interest rates (grey line).
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(b) Belgium 2009-12
Jan09 Aug09 Mar10 Sep10 Apr11 Oct11 May12 Nov12
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
  
(Correlation coef: −0.6070)
Stock market index (HEX)
Risk premium
(c) Finland 2009-12
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(d) France 2009-12
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(i) Spain 2009-12
-1 for almost every country for some sub-period of time. Therefore in times when the risk
of default is high the value of stocks drops. This feature is helpful in calibration.
Calibration: there are two sets of parameters that are key in solving the model. The first
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comprises the stock of bonds issued, b, the risk free interest rate,r and taxes as a proportion
of GDP, T
GDP
. These are exogenous parameters which are directly imposed, and which the
government takes as given in making its default decision. We solve the model many times to
calibrate the parameters that characterise the regime-switching stochastic process: µd, µnd,
σd and σnd. We also choose a tax rate, τ , that is consistent with the concept of government
budget balance that we use to define government value functions.
The tax rate, τ , is identified through the smooth pasting condition in equation 1, which sets
a value for the marginal revenue of the government at Ad as a function of the parameters
of the stochastic process in the default region and the tax rate. Assuming that marginal
revenues are equal to the average revenues of the government in the data, the tax parameter
can by found by equating the marginal value of repaying at the boundary of the default
region with T/GDP
W ′(Ad) =
τ
r − µd + σ2d/2
= T/GDP.
Our results do not rely on the assumption that the government’s marginal revenues are equal
to its average revenues: better estimates of marginal tax rates, as in McDaniel (2011), are not
far enough away from average taxes to matter in the period of time that we are considering.
The parameters of the stochastic productivity process µnd, σnd, µd, σd are chosen to minimise
the square deviation of normalised stock prices and the variance of stock prices.9 We solve
this problem by simulating the model repeatedly and following the steps of this algorithm:
Calibration Algorithm: Given b, r and an initial guess at the parameters of the stochastic
productivity process {µnd, σnd, µd, σd}:
1. We compute τ = [r − µd + σ2d/2] (T/GDP ).
2. Given τ , we compute the default threshold Ad by solving equation (1).
9We normalise both simulated series and data at the beginning of our estimation period for each country.
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3. Given Ad we use equation (2) to compute the xt = log
(
At
Ad
)
that match the risk
premium series data.
4. Given xt we simulate productivity series At = Ade
xt .
5. We simulate Vt by solving equation (3).
6. We compute the objective function of the minimisation routine: a) the mean quadratic
deviation of the simulated stock prices series from data; b) the quadratic deviation of
the standard deviation of the simulated stock prices series from data; c) the quadratic
deviation of the drift of the simulated productivity series from the initial guess; and
d) the quadratic deviation of the volatility of the simulate productivity series from the
initial guess.
7. We use a minimisation routine to update the parameters of the stochastic productivity
process.
To implement the details of the algorithm we rely on two series of data and a reduction in
the dimensionality of the parameter space. We use the risk premium pˆit and stock prices Vˆt
as described in the previous section. In order to simplify the calibration, we guess a value
for the drift and variance of the stochastic productivity process in case of no default: µnd
and σnd. This is a harmless simplification for our purpose, given that we are interested in
how much drift and volatility would change in case of a default. Therefore our minimisation
routine searches for µd and σd.
Step 1 of the algorithm is trivial as we have the equation that computes τ , given values
for µd and σd. In step 2 we compute the value of the default region in equilibrium, Ad, by
solving equation 1. We need series for productivity that are consistent with the observations
in the data. In step 3 we use Ad, pˆit and the solution of the equation that determines the
probability of default, p(A), to work out a series for productivity consistent with the observed
14
risk premiums, Aˆt, which can be written as:
Aˆt = p
−1
(
1
pˆit + (1 + r)
Ad, µnd, σnd
)
Note that we do not use information for µd and σd to compute Aˆt as the price of a bond is
zero in the default region, so it is not affected by the nature of the stochastic process when
it switches regimes. We write down the drift and the volatility of this process as µˆnd and
σˆnd.
In step 5, given Aˆt and our guesses for µˆnd and σˆnd, we solve equation 3 to obtain a value
of the firm, Vt, consistent with the trend over time in its fundamental value. Note that this
value is also consistent with the information contained in the observed risk premium. Finally
we construct an objective function for our minimisation routine as described in step 6. This
objective function consists of the mean quadratic deviation of the simulated value of the firm
relative to the stock prices in the data
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Vt − Vˆt
)2
and we augment the objective function with three additional moments: the quadratic de-
viation of the volatility of the simulated firm value relative to the volatility of stock prices,
the quadratic deviation of the drift of the productivity process,µˆnd, relative to our guess,
µnd, and the quadratic deviation of the volatility of the productivity process, σˆnd relative
to our guess σnd. The algorithm stops when µd and σd such that the objective function is
minimised to a certain degree of precision. With the parameters estimated we can measure
how much TFP falls in case of a default.
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4 Results
This section presents the results of our calibration and explores the quantitative implications
of the calibrated model. To that end we apply our model to the study of four issues. The
first is whether the model produces sensible predictions as to how much GDP falls after a
default. The second is a comparison of whether the model produces rates of growth of GDP
after a default that are compatible with the rates of growth in the countries in our sample
after the sovereign debt crisis. As countries grow after a crisis, recovery is inevitable. It is
only a matter of time before the previous levels of GDP are recovered. Therefore, the third
is whether the model is capable of producing a reasonable distribution of recovery times. To
test this implication we examine Argentina’s recovery from its default in 2002. A theoretical
prediction of general equilibrium models of default is that more indebted countries have
larger default regions. We use our model and cross country variations of debt to GDP to
study whether this fits the theory. Therefore, the fourth issue is to examine whether our
model is consistent with the theoretical prediction that default zones shrink with reductions
in the level of debt of a typical country.
Baseline productivity process. Our main target is to calibrate the productivity process of
a typical country, so we pool all countries (and all years) and run the calibration algorithm.10
Table 3: Baseline Calibration (in annualised %)
Aut Bel Fin Fra Ire Ita Ndl Por Spa Pooled
µ 2.3907 2.3899 2.3873 2.3897 2.3899 2.3870 2.3879 2.3898 2.3850 2.3923
σ 3.3756 5.3386 2.0847 4.8034 6.1940 5.0912 2.0436 7.0856 6.0494 4.3436
The last column of Table 3 shows that a typical country’s productivity rate of growth is 2.39%
in nominal terms, a number that seems reasonable given that the average inflation rate of the
10We use the average debt-to-GDP and taxes-to-GDP ratios for the countries in our sample as exogenous
inputs for our calibration algorithm.
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countries in our sample is 1.57%. The productivity growth rate across countries seems to be
fairly constant and does not seem to be related to idiosyncratic volatilities.11 Volatilities are
quite heterogeneous across countries but this comes as no surprise as countries face different
yield curves and issue and restructure their debt with different maturity structures. Cunha
(2013) highlights that countries with shorter debt maturities face a higher risk of rollover
that may be captured in idiosyncratic volatilities. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) also
record a negative correlation between the maturity of debt and bond spreads. Eurostat
reports that in 2014 roughly 40% of Spain’s debt had maturity periods of less than 7 years,
whereas 92% of Finland’s debt matured at more than 15 years.
We evaluate the distribution of errors, defined as the difference between the model prediction
and the stock prices in the data. To summarise key statistics we rely on the use of box-plots
for the distribution of these errors. Figure 4 presents box-plots for each country, assuming
them to be endowed with the pooled calibration stochastic process. Most of the errors fall
within the 10% bands from zero, the median is very close to zero for most countries and
there are not many outliers in general. Measuring the cost of a default by comparing how
much the drift would have fallen does not therefore seem a far-fetched experiment.
Finally, our findings can be compared with papers that study the cost of default in private
business, particularly in the US. Unlike them, we compute an “average cost”. Therefore
our calibration must be bounded by the cost of default estimated for an individual firm.
Davydenko et al. (2012) estimate that the cost of default is 21.70% of a firm’s value. This
figure can be compared with our estimates if it is assumed that production is characterised
by a labour-augmenting Cobb-Douglas technology y = A1−αkαl1−α, where the price of a firm
is the value of its capital stock, according to the neoclassical growth model. In equilibrium,
the capital stock is proportional to productivity: k ≈ A 11−α . Therefore, for a typical value
of α = .36, we find that a drop in the value of the firm of 21.70% is equivalent to a fall
11Danthine and Jin (2007) show that financial volatility is a multiple of macroeconomic volatility.
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of 14.40% in productivity. Glober (2013) finds default costs by industry in the range of
0.35-0.53, equivalent to a fall in TFP in the range of 0.20-0.35.
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Figure 3: Error distribution: 10% bands. In each box, the central mark is the median; the
edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles. The red cross represents outliers. The
whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered as outliers.
Defaults and productivity drops. Our measure of the instantaneous cost of a default,
in terms of productivity, is the ratio of the drift in case of default relative to no-default: µd
µnd
.
Table 4 shows that productivity falls by 3.70% if we pool all countries into a single figure,
although there is some cross-country heterogeneity which reflects differences in indebtedness
and tax proceeds over GDP across the countries in our sample, among other things. Never-
theless, when we average the default costs of each country we find that the average cost of
default is 5.88%
Therefore, our model provides an estimate of the productivity cost of a default consistent
with many general equilibrium models in the literature, which typically adopt a figure of 5%.
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Table 4: Drops
Aut Bel Fin Fra Ire Ita Ndl Por Spa Pooled Mean
∆µ 97.03 99.63 68.29 99.98 98.73 97.35 86.42 99.99 99.66 96.30 94.12
∆σ 45.21 21.39 75.42 23.84 18.56 23.26 97.02 16.16 18.85 26.15 37.74
∆µ = µd/µnd
∆σ = σd/σnd
The paper by Cole and Kehoe (2000) is one of the first to target a 5% drop in productivity
for a 2% probability of default in the case of Mexico. Da-Rocha et al. (2013) assume the
same figure for Argentina. Nun˜o Barrau and Thomas (2015) target an output loss of 6%
for the European Monetary Union and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2015) target 4.5% in
a study for Brazil. By comparison, our model predicts a productivity fall of 3.70%. We
therefore find a very similar default cost using a different model to exploit a different source
of information, with different countries and in a different period.
Defaults and recovery time. Defaults in sovereign debt are typically associated with
output drops and sudden stops, where GDP falls at the time of default and growth subse-
quently resumes at a slower rate. Ito’s Lemma can be invoked to derive a stochastic process
to describe GDP, assuming it is characterised by a Cobb-Douglass labour augmenting tech-
nology. The drift of this Brownian motion, µy, is µy = (1−α)
(
µA − α2σ2A
)
and the standard
deviation σy is σy = (1− α)σA. For a value of α = .36, it ispossible to derive how far GDP
falls instantly at default as
µdy
µndy
; µdy will be the rate at which a country grows after default.
Our model predicts that GDP will fall by 3.71% for a typical country. Between 2008-2009
GDP fell by 4% on average, so the predicted fall in GDP in our model is consistent with
data averages. The third test of our model consists of comparing the expected growth after
default in our model, 1.17%, with that which actually took place in the countries in the
sample.
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Figure 4: The distribution of GDP recovery dates when the 2001 Argentina’s GDP fell is
examined using the pooled productivity process.
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As growth resumes after a crisis, recovery is inevitable. We can explore whether the model
provides a reasonable distribution of recovery dates. We define the recovery date as the time
when GDP reverts to the level prior to the default. With our model we can compute the
probability distribution of a recovery in closed form.12
To illustrate this idea, Figure 4 plots the distribution of GDP recovery dates when Argentina
is examined via our pooled productivity process. In 2001, Argentina’s GDP fell by 20%. The
probability of recovery after two years in the default region was 2/3, so in our model there
is a fair chance of a fast recovery but a long-lasting recovery such as that experienced by the
Greek economy is not ruled out.Guido and Werning (2013) build a model where there are
slow moving crises to account for the European sovereign bond crises, compared to rollover
12Let x¯ = log( yyd ) (where yd is the default threshold in terms of GDP) be a random variable. In this case,
recovery is defined as x¯ = 0. A recovery date can be defined as T (x) = {T : x¯ ≥ 0} and, following Harrison
(1985),the distribution of recovery dates can be written as
P (T (x) > t) =
φ(x− µyt
σy
√
t
)
− e
2µyx
σ2y φ
(−x− µyt
σy
√
t
)
where φ is a N (0 , 1 ) distribution function.
20
crises such as that of Argentina. Our model is able to accommodate both as there is still a
20% chance of not recovering seven years later.
Table 5: Default Zones
Aut Bel Fin Fra Ire Ita Ndl Por Spa
Ad 81.06 107.25 47.20 89.08 136.93 140.00 77.15 127.14 94.20
Default zones and initial debt. A theoretical prediction of models of sovereign default
such as that of Cole and Kehoe (2000) is that the size of the default zone increases monoton-
ically with the level of debt. To quantify the relationship between debt and default regions,
we endow each country with the pooled stochastic process and compute a default region, Ad,
by solving the equilibrium for each country (Table 5). The magnitude of these raw numbers
is hard to grasp, so we normalise the average of the default regions to 100 and plot it against
debt-to-GDP in Figure 5. This confirms the positive link between debt and the size of the
default zone. Finland has a default zone 40% smaller than the average with a debt-to-GDP
ratio of 49%, whereas Italy has a default zone 40% larger than the average for a ratio of
120%.
Default zones and debt consolidation. Debt consolidation was standard policy advice
during the European sovereign debt crisis. However, the quantitative impact of debt consoli-
dation on the probability of default and its cost is subject to much controversy. The positive
correlation between debt and default zones can be exploited to shed some light on the issue.
Figure 5 depicts a regression which shows the expected default zone, Ad,i, for a given level
of debt, bi
Ad = β0 + β1b
A debt consolidation policy, ∇b, can be imposed to measure how far the default zone is
expected to drop, , Aˆd = Ad + β1∇b. With this new threshold we compute a probability of
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Figure 5: The left hand side shows the expected default zone, Ad,i, for a given level of debt,
bi. The right hand side shows the impact on GDP growth of a debt consolidation of 25% .
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(b) 25% Debt Consolidation
default pˆd = pd
(
1− β1∇b
Ad
)
which implies a risk premium of pˆid =
pˆd
pd
(
1−pd
1−pˆd
)
. We also compute
a new equilibrium value of stocks, keeping the same stochastic process. It is possible to find
a new log productivity of a firm and V (xˆ)− V (x), the change in the value of firms induced
by debt consolidation. Of course this effect is heterogeneous across countries.
An example of this heterogeneity is displayed on the right hand side of Figure 5, which shows
what the impact of a debt consolidation of 25% would have been on the GDP growth rate,
given the initial stock of debt.13 Consider Spain, an otherwise average country. If Spain had
reduced its debt by 25% if would have increased the value of its firms by 1%, which would
have translated into an increase of .65% in GDP. Flipping the argument around, we conclude
that attempts to mitigate the effect of the sovereign debt crisis through fiscal expansions had
little effect on the economy. Our model implies small fiscal multipliers, another observation
that seems consistent with the data.
13The solid line represents the average.
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5 Conclusions
There is a growing macro literature that seeks to understand sovereign default episodes.
Many papers in this literature either assume a 5% permanent drop in TFP as the cost of a
default or find similar costs as a by-product of calibrating their models to aggregate data.
Given the importance of this number, we seek to provide an alternative measurement using
a different model and a different kind of data, in a very particular period.
To calibrate the cost of a default, we build a continuous time model of government default
decisions and take it to the data to match the trends in stock prices and sovereign debt risk
premiums for a sample of European countries. We select continental European countries
during the 2009-2014 debt crises. In this period, countries experienced a large negative
correlation between risk premiums and stock prices. Our model exploits this large negative
correlation to measure the cost of a default in terms of TFP, imposing a structural link
between the rise in risk premiums and drops in stock prices.
We find that the cost of default for a typical country is a permanent drop of 3.70% in TFP.
If we run our calibration for each country and average their costs of default, we find that
TFP falls by 5.88%. These numbers are remarkably close to the 5% permanent drop that is
commonly used in the macro literature, and provide strong support for the use of this figure.
We argue for the goodness of our estimate through a number of examples which illustrate
that our model, despite its simplicity, is consistent with several key features of countries that
experienced debt crises. It is consistent with expected falls in GDP and with recovery rates
of growth. It can accommodate the recovery experiences of countries such as Argentina and
it provides a reasonable narrative as to why the fiscal policies of European countries had a
very small multiplying effect on economic activity.
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A Appendix
This appendix presents the solution of the second order differential equations 1, 2 and 3.
Solution of Equation 2. For any Ad > 0, using x = log
(
A
Ad
)
, the debt price is the solution of the
boundary-value problem that consists of solving the equation:
− rq(x) + µˆndq′(x) + σ
2
nd
2
q′′(x) = 0 (4)
with boundary conditions q(0) = 0 and q′(0) = k, where µˆnd = µnd − 12σ2nd < 0 and k is an arbi-
trary constant. We solve the boundary-value problem using Laplace transforms, L [q(x)]. Laplace
transforms are given by
L [q′(x)] = sL [q(x)]− q(0),
L [q′′(x)] = s2L [q(x)]− sq(0)− q′(0).
By applying Laplace transforms in equation (4)
(
σ2nd
2
s2 + µˆnds− r)L [q(x)]− (s+ µˆnd)q(0)− σ
2
nd
2
q′(0) = 0 (5)
and the boundary condition g(0) = 0, we obtain:
L [q(x)] =
σ2nd
2
k
(s− z1)(s− z2) ,
where zi =
(
−µˆnd ±
√
µˆ2nd + 2rσ
2
nd
) (
σ2nd
)−1
, i = 1, 2. We obtain the solution by solving the
Laplace inverses given by:
q(x) = L −1
[
kσ2nd/2
(s− z1)(s− z2)
]
=
kσ2nd/2
(z1 − z2) (e
z1x − ez2x) = 1
1 + r
(
ez2x − ez1x
ez2x − ez1x
)
(6)
and taking into account the second boundary condition, limx→x q(x) = 11+r where x = log
(
A∗
Ad
)
.
Solution of Equation 1. Equation default regions are characterised by the non-homogeneous second-
order differential equation
rW (x)− µˆndW ′(x)− σ
2
nd
2
W ′′(x) = τAdex + [q(x)− 1]b
with boundary conditions W (0) =
τAd
r − µd + σ2d/2
and W ′(0) =
τAd
r − µd + σ2d/2
. Taking the Laplace
Transform of both sides of the differential equation default regions are characterised by solving(
r − µˆnds− σ
2
nd
2
s2
)
L [W (x)] = −
(
µˆnd +
σ2nd
2
s
)
W (0)− σ
2
nd
2
W ′(0)− b
s
+
τAd
s− 1 + bL [q(x)],
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where
L [q(x)] =
1
(1 + r)(ez1x − ez2x)
[
1
s− z1 +
1
s− z2
]
.
H(s) = L [W (x)] satisfies,
H(s) =
P1 + P2s+ P3s
2 + P4s
3 + P5s
4 + P6s
5
s(s− 1)(s− z1)2(s− z2)2
where the vector P is given by
P =

0 −1 0 0 0
−1 1 + z1 + z2 0 0 0
1 + z1 + z2 −z1z2 + z1 + z2 −1 1 0
−(z1z2 + z1 + z2) z1z2 1 + z1 + z2 −(z1 + z2) −(z2 − z1)
z1z2 0 −(z1z2 + z1 + z2) z1z2 z2 − z1
0 0 z1z2 0 0


µˆndW (0) +
σ21W
′(0)
2
σ21W
′(0)
2
b
τAd
(1+r)b
(ez2x−ez1x)

Expanding H(s) in partial fractions
H(s) =
C1
s
+
C2
s− 1 +
C3
(s− z1) +
C4
(s− z2) +
C5
(s− z1)2 +
C6
(s− z2)2 ,
Applying the Laplace inverses given by:
W (x) = L −1[H(s)] = C1 − C2 ∗ ex + C3xez1x + C4xez2x + C5x2e2z1x + C6x2e2z2x
we can find the the solution of W (x) by solving a system of linear equations which can be written
in matrix notation as: [
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
]T
= Λ−1P
and Λ is equal to
1 1 1 1 0 0
−(2z1 + z2 + 1) −2(z1 + z2) −(2z2 + z1 + 1) −(2z2 + z2 + 1) 1 1
4z1z2 + z
2
1z
2
2 + 2(z1 + z2) 4z1z2 + z
2
1 + z
2
2 z2(z2 + 2z1) + 2z2 + z1 z1(z1 + 2z2) + 2z1 + z2 −(1 + 2z1) −(1 + 2z2)
−2( z212 + z2 + z1z22 + 2z1z2)− z22 −2(z1z22 + z2z21) −(z1z2 + z2(z2 + 2z1)) −(z1z2 + z1(z1 + 2z2)) z1(1 + 2z1) z2(1 + 2z2)
z21z
2
2 + 2(z1z
2
2 + z
2
1z2) z
2
1z
2
2 z1z2 z1z2 −z21 −z22
−z21z22 0 0 0 0 0

Given µnd, σ
2
nd µd, σ
2
d and r, b and τ , Ad, is obtained by solving W (x) = L
−1[H(s)] at x = 0, i.e.
W (0) = W (x)|x=0 = C0(Ad)− C1(Ad) =
τAd
r − µd + σ2d/2
. (7)
Solution of Equation 3. To solve firm value if the government has not defaulted Vnd(A), we rewrite
the switching problem throughthe following change of variable g x = log
(
A
Ad
)
[
r − e−
(
1− 2µnd
σ2
nd
)
x
]
Vnd(xt) = µˆndV
′
nd(xt) +
σ2nd
2
V ′′nd(xt) + e
−
(
1− 2µnd
σ2
)
x
Aβdd e
βdx (8)
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where boundary conditions are given by Vnd(0) = Ade
βd and V ′nd(0) = β0Ade
βd , and the probability
of defaulting is e
−
(
1− 2µnd
σ2
)
x
. We solve equation 8 with a power series expansion. The basic idea
is similar to that in the method of undetermined coefficients: We assume that the solutions of a
given differential equation have power series expansions, and then we attempt to determine the
coefficients so as to satisfy the differential equation. Equation 8 can be rewritten as[
r − e(−a0x)
]
V − a1V ′ − a2V ′′ = a3ebx. (9)
We use the notation V = Vnd(0). Consider a Taylor expansion
V (x) = V + V ′x+
n∑
k=2
1
k!
V
′(n)xn.
Differentiating equation (9) n times yields a linear system

λ1,0(r − 1) −a1 −a2 0 ... 0 0 0
λ2,0a0 λ2,1(r − 1) −a1 −a2 ... 0 0 0
λ3,0a
2
0 λ3,1a0 λ3,2(r − 1) −a1 ... 0 0 0
λ4,0a
3
0 λ4,1a
2
0 λ4,2a0 λ4,3(r − 1) ... 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
λn+1,0a
n+1
0 λn+1,1a
n
0 λn+1,2a
n−1
0 ... λn+1,n−1a0 λn+1,n(r − 1) −a1 −a2


V
V ′
V ′′
V ′(3)
...
V ′(n)
V ′(n+1)
V ′(n+2)

= a3

1
b
b2
b3
...
bn+1

where λn,j = (−1)n+j+1
(
n!
j!
)
are the Pascal’s triangle numbers (in absolute value). Given
this recurrence relationship, the successive coefficients can be evaluated one by one by writing the
recurrence relationship first for n = 0, then for n = 1, and so on. Therefore, the solution is merely
a function of the boundary conditionsV0 and V
′
0 , i.e.

V ′′
V (3)
V (4)
V (5)
...
V (n+2)
 =

−a2 0 ... 0 0 0
−a1 −a2 ... 0 0 0
(r − 1) −a1 ... 0 0 0
3a0 (r − 1) ... 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
an−10 ... na0 (r − 1) −a1 −a2

−1a3

1
b
b2
b3
...
bn−1
−

(r − 1) −a1
a0 (r − 1)
−a20 2a0
a30 −3a20
... ...
an+10 (n+ 1)a
n
0

[
V0
V ′0
]
 .
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